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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
§78-34-7 U.C.A 1953 AS AMENDED IS TO 
BE USED ONLY FOR DETERMINING AMOUNTS OF 
FUTURE SUPPORT 
Respondent's Brief (Page 3) conceeds that a father 
in the State of Utah has an absolute duty to support his wife 
and children, and that a prior court order of support is not a 
prerequisite to seeking either a prospective support order, or an 
order directing reimbursement for support already provided. 
Respondents then turn around and argue on Page 4 that "under the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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UCLSA, the determination of both prospective and retroactive 
support liability must be made by the District Court pursuant 
to the criteria set out in §78-45-7 U.C.A." 
§78-45-7 U.C.A. pertains to hearings to determine 
prospective support only and does not apply to reimbursement. 
The seven factors named for consideration are all prospective 
in nature. That is, each factor should be considered independently 
and with the others in determining an amount to be paid in the 
future. Thus, U.C.A. §78-45-7 should be applied only in hearings 
for prospective support. The standard reimbursement set out in 
§78-45-9 U.C.A. should be used in cases of recovery for past 
support, (Discussion: Point III, Appellant's Brief). 
Much of Respondent's brief involves arguments that an 
obligor's liability for past support should be based upon his 
actual current ability to provide. Appellant, primarily concerned | 
with reimbursement for prior support when the State of Utah is 
forced to assume the obligation, takes issue with Respondent's 
position. Thus, much of the language and case citation throughout f 
Respondents' brief attempting to distinguish between duty and 
liability of support, is simply inapplicable to the basic issue 
of retroactive reimbursement for support rendered under §78-45-9, 4 
U.C.A. The obvious injustice of following Respondent's argument 
is the following hypothetical. A defendant earns $1,500.00 a month 
for three years of a separation with no divorce. At the time of 4 
hearing he is unemployed. To say, that the defendant's liability 
for back support is based on his unemployment is indeed a miscarriage 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of justice. Reimbursement means reimbursement. Respondents1 
arguments tend to obscure the issue before the court. 
POINT II 
UNDER THE UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR 
SUPPORT ACT, SUPPORT LIABILITY IS 
DETERMINED BY THE SUPPORT LAW OF EACH 
STATE 
Respondents and Appellants both recognize that under 
UCLSA, support liability is determined by the support law of 
each state. On Page 8 of their brief, Respondents quote from 
the Commissioner's Prefatory Note to the UCLSA, Uniform Laws 
Annotated, Master Edition, Vol 9 at pg. 133: 
"Under these sections then the recovery 
by the destitute obligee is to be measured 
by the duty of support set out in the law 
of the state where the obligor is present " 
Appellants submit that Utah law on duty of support, under 
§78-45-3 U.C.A., does not measure the amount of recovery. Rather, 
it provides in §78-45-7 criteria to determine prospective support 
owed by an obligor, and in §78-45-9, a means to recover past 
support supplied by the state, in an action for reimbursement 
against an obligor who has failed in his statutory duty to 
support his family. This is the state law referred to in the above 
quoted section. 
On Page 10 of Respondent's brief, they argue that: 
"Under Utah law, there need not be a prior 
court order of support for a court to conduct 
a hearing to determine liability for support 
already provided." 
Of course there need not be a prior court order of support for 
a court to conduct a hearing to determine liability for support Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
already provided. First of all, had there already been a 
court order, the amount of liability would have already been set, 
and another hearing would be unnecessary. But, more importantly, 
i 
the issue of duty and liability of support is determined 
statutorily under.the UCLSA, and thus no such hearing is required. 
Rather, the obligor is under a statutory duty to support his 
1 
obligees, §78-45-3, and when he fails to do so, his amount of 
liability has already been set statutorily under §78-4 5-9 for 
support already provided. That liability is reimbursement. 
His future liability for support is statutorily set by §78-45-7, 
and is judicially determined in a hearing. Thus, the only 
purpose for a hearing under §78-45-9 is to get a judgment rendered 
against the obligor to reimburse the state, and §78-4 5-7 does 
not apply in reimbursement cases. 
On Page 9 of their brief, Respondents cite emotionally 
inflamatory language from Brocklebanky s Interstate Enforcement of 
Family Support 2nd Ed. 1971. "This becomes at times a sort of 
sadistic cry, 'Lets soak the fleeing puppy.' But this is an 
unworthy objective. No law should ever 'soak' anybody." First 
of all, Appellants would like to point that Brocklebankfs book 
is a treatise on the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, ^ 
not on the UCLSA which is the subject of the instant litigation. 
The UCLSA was enacted to statutorily establish duties of support, 
not to "soak" runaway obligors. Surely Respondents imply by | 
quoting such language that because the State of Utah merely seeks 
reimbursement from obligors for support given to needy obligees, 
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that the UCLSA is a law designed to "soak" such obligor. If 
anything, it would appear that delinquent obligors are "soaking" 
the taxpayers of the State of Utah. To the contrary of 
Respondent's implications, §78-45-9 is intended to protect the 
rights of helpless obligees in the State of Utah, who without 
such legal recourse, would be subject to no hope of support, save 
from the state. Likewise, the State of Utah can hardly be said to 
be "soaking" an obligor when it forces such an individual to face 
up to his legal and moral support obligations. 
POINT III 
THE UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT 
ACT WAS ENACTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING 
SUPPORT FOR NEEDY OBLIGEES, AND, FOR PROVIDING 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ACTING AS A THIRD PARTY, 
WITH A RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR NECESSARIES 
FURNISHED. 
Point III of Respondent's brief, Page 11, contains 
the following argument that the UCLSA was: 
"... enacted for the purpose of obtaining 
support for needy obligees, not for 
providing the State of Utah, acting as a 
third party, with a right to reimburesment..." 
This interpretation of the statute totally disregards the 
language of it. The UCLSA was enacted for the purpose of obtaining 
support for needy obligees from the obligors who have a duty to 
support, thereby relieving the State of Utah of the burden of 
support. Furthermore, §78-45-9 U.C.A. was expressly enacted for 
the very purpose of providing the State of Utah with a right to 
reimbursement. The language of the statute could not' be any 
plainer: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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" — for the purpose of securing reimbursement 
and of obtaining countinuing support..." 
(Emphasis added). 
Respondents next argue on Page 14 of their brief 
"that 'reimbursement1, as used in §78-45-9, U.C.A. means 
reimbursement of support, not reimbursement of necessaries 
furnished by a third party." Appellants submit that this is 
' i 
indeed a subtle distinction. Traditionally "support" has been 
used in family law to mean providing necessities, whereas alimony 
has always been variable based on many factors. The instant 
i 
cases deal with support, and reimbursement for support under 
statutory duties to the children and wives before the divorce. 
Respondent's authorities dealing with alimony do not apply. 
Respondents on Page 15 of their brief cite numerous 
authorities pertaining to divorce and divorce modification to 
support Respondent's position that §78-45-7 should be used to 
i 
determine retroactive amounts due in reimbursement cases. These 
authorities merely cloud and confuse the real issue, rather than 
explicate the statute in question. We are not dealirjxj with 
i 
divorce cases here. The support obligations provided for in 
§78-45-1 et. seq. are not alimony and child support declared 
pursuant to a divorce decree. There is no sum certain as per a 
divorce decree, to modify an overdue installment. Rather, the 
statute imposes a statutory obligation to support wives and 
children. Failure to do so provides the State of Utah with an 
action for reimbursement for the support it was forced to render. 
Respondents attempt to distinguish in Los Angeles vs. 
Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d 634, 122 P.2d 526 (1942), the statutes 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in question as "quite different from the UCLSA." This is a 
matter of degree for the court to decide. Appellants will 
only note that for statutes that are "quite different", they 
are strikingly similiar in purpose and intent. The Frisbie case, 
id, statute is further attacked by Respondents: That it 
"clearly and unequivocally states that the obligor shall reimburse 
the county, a far cry from §78-45-9's conferring of a right to 
seek reimbursement." Appellants fail to see the seemingly 
great distinction between the statutes involved. Respondents 
merely assert such differences exist but do not point them out. 
In essence, they argue their conclusion. Respondents further use 
the same tactic in summarily dismissing Longevin v. Hillsborough 
County, 320 A.2d 635, where the distinction appears to be a 
"direct right (New Hampshire) vs. a subrogated right (Utah)." 
Such a distinction seems miniscule. Respondents cite Restatement 
of the Law of Restitution-Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts, 
which has no bearing on the instant case. They then argue that 
the State of Utah has an "affirmative duty to provide assistance 
to 'persons in need1, [and therefore] cannot be deemed to be 
acting 'unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor1 within 
the meaning of the Restatement of Restitution, supra." 
First of all, the persons with the affirmative duty 
to support "persons in need", i.e. obligees, are the obligors, 
not the State of Utah. The very intent of §78-45-1 et. seq. 
is to protect the State of Utah from incurring such a support 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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burden. Secondly, the issue here is not how the State of 
Utah's conduct measures up according to the language in the 
Restatement of the Law of Restitution. Rather, the issue is 
the meaning of the statutory language found in §78-45-9 U.C.A. 
Respondent's last two sentences on Page 19 of their 
brief, without any support, authority, or even logic, state that since 
the obligees in the instant cases did not furnish their own support, 
the State of Utah has no independent third party right to 
reimbursement. Such an interpretation of §78-45-9 U.C.A. is a total 
misreading of the statute. If the obligees had in fact furnished 
the support, the State of Utah would not have been required to do 
so and thus would not be involved at all. More importantly, 
Respondents would have the Court believe that the obligees have 
a right to enforce the duty of support against the obligor only 
when the obligees themselves have provided such support. This 
is not the intent, purpose or meaning of the UCLSA. As indicated 
by Appellants arguments, the general purpose of this entire area 
of Utah law is to provide means whereby collection of delinquent 
support is made easier. U.C.A. §78-45-13 requires interpretation 
to effectuate and implement those procedures. Thus, the obligee 
need not furnish his own support before enforcing that right 
against an obligor. Likewise, §78-45-9 states: 
"Whenever the State department of public 
welfare furnishes support to an obligee, 
it has the same right as the obligee to whom 
the support was furnished for the purpose of 
securing reimbursement..." 
(Emphasis added). 
Thus, if the obligee has a statutory right to enforce, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the State of Utah by subrogation has the same statutory right. 
Any different reading of the above statute than that here 
expressed strains the meaning of it and renders an improper 
construction. 
Respondents1 conclusion indicating that a separate 
hearing need be held prior to the State of Utah filing an action 
against them, is misleading. The law suit as here involved 
contains all the elements necessary for the hearing. Otherwise, 
Respondents are seeking two separate hearings to determine the 
same thing. At trial or in discovery, the Respondents have the 
opportunity to present their defenses, if any, and at that time, 
the Court makes a determination of the amount owing for back 
support as well as establishing prospective support orders. 
Contrary to what the Respondents claim, the burden of Utah taxpayers 
would be greatly increased instead of reduced if the district court 
was sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants submit this reply brief for the purpose of 
clarifying issues Appellants feel have been intentionally 
confused by Respondents. Baggs vs. Anderson, Utah 2d, 53 8 P.2d 
141 (1974), as well as Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9 permit the 
State of Utah to prevail in this action and therefore Appellant 
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requests this court to reverse the decision of the Weber 
County District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
FRANK V. NELSON 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Attorneys General 
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